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Abstract:  The conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, opposing Armenia and Azerbaijan, is the 
longest conflict in the OSCE area and a fundamental security threat to the South Caucasus and 
surrounding regions, preventing full and inclusive economic development and constraining 
regional relations. This chapter takes the ENP as a conflict transformation tool and looks at 
how the EU has used this initiative to reach civil society organisations (CSOs) and improve 
their performance as peace-builders in this protracted conflict. Building on the theoretical 
framework presented by Tocci (2008), the chapter assesses EU involvement in the civil society 
domain, mapping the types of organisations privileged by the EU and the potential impact of 
their activities on the conflict. It puts forward relevant arguments regarding the suitability of 
the EU’s goals and instruments to the dynamics on the ground and concludes with a 
categorisation of the EU’s approach according to three hypotheses: The Liberal Peace, the 
Leftist Critique and the Realist hypothesis. It is argues that work with civil society is a crucial 
part of the EU’s approach, despite the difficulties of making such engagement a central part of 
its peace-building and conflict transformation activities. 
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Introduction 
The conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, opposing Armenia and Azerbaijan, is the longest 
conflict in the OSCE area and a fundamental security threat to the South Caucasus and 
surrounding regions, preventing full and inclusive economic development and constraining 
regional relations. The benefits of independence from the Soviet Union have been thwarted by 
the war and, in the long-term, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh have been unable 
to fully part-take in the global and regional processes of economic and political development. 
External powers acting in the region have managed the existing cease-fire, but have been 
unable to gather the necessary will and resources to bring about a sustainable and mutually 
acceptable peace agreement. The presence of the European Union (EU), through the 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) could represent an important incentive for peace.  
 
This chapter takes the ENP as a conflict transformation tool and looks at how the EU 
has used this initiative to reach civil society organisations (CSOs) and improve their 
performance as peace-builders in this protracted conflict. Building on the theoretical 
framework presented by Tocci (2008), the chapter assesses EU involvement in the civil society 
domain, mapping the types of organisations privileged by the EU and the potential impact of 
their activities on the conflict. It puts forward relevant arguments regarding the suitability of 
the EU’s goals and instruments to the dynamics on the ground and concludes with a 
categorisation of the EU’s approach according to three hypotheses: the Liberal Peace, which 
contends that EU policies aim to increase the interconnectedness between government 
structures and mid and top level CSOs, on the one hand, and between these CSOs and 
grassroots, on the other (Tocci 2008, 27); the Leftist Critique assumes that EU actions have a 
detrimental impact on CSOs role in conflict transformation, since EU engagement 
fundamentally alters the nature of the CSOs, depoliticising or co-opting them (Tocci 2008, 28-
30); and finally the Realist hypothesis, which sees conflict resolution as mainly a prerogative 
of state actors and top levels of society and therefore, advocates that in order for the EU to 
affect conflict dynamics it should focus on these actors (Tocci 2008, 31). 
  
Although conflict resolution in Eurasia has gradually become a priority for the EU and 
its member states (Popescu 2007; Stewart 2008), the Nagorno Karabakh conflict rose to the top 
of the EU’s agenda only after the war in South Ossetia, in 2008. Moreover, the gradual 
improvement of Armenian-Turkish relations has also opened a window of opportunity for 3 
 
movement in the Nagorno Karabakh peace process, which the EU could support through 
confidence building measures (CBMs). Work with civil society is referred as a crucial part of 
the EU’s approach, despite the difficulties of making such engagement a central part of its 
peace-building and conflict transformation activities.  
 
1.  Conflict Dynamics 
The conflict over the Nagorno Karabakh territory, while sharing most of the 
characteristics of other protracted conflicts in Eurasia,
3 displays and increased level of 
complexity. Being populated almost exclusively by Armenians, the Nagorno Karabakh enclave 
inside Azerbaijan has relied on military, political and financial assistance from the Armenian 
Republic, making it a part to the conflict. Although several United Nations (UN) resolutions 
recognise Karabakh as part of the Azerbaijani Republic,
4 and no state (including Armenia) has 
recognised the Nagorno Karabakh Republic’s (NKR) declaration of independence,
5 the 
isolation of the separatist region and the international politics of non-recognition have left 
Karabakh highly dependent on Armenia and have severed all direct channels with Azerbaijan, 
over the last twenty years. Thus, the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh is best portrayed as an 
interstate conflict, with visible impact on the domestic constituencies of both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, making any analysis of civil society engagement in conflict resolution highly 
incomplete if this interstate dimension is not reflected.  
 
It can therefore be said that the dispute over Nagorno Karabakh is an ethno-territorial 
conflict of an interstate nature with elements of irredentism and separatism. This complex mix 
has made the task of finding mutually acceptable solutions to the conflict much harder. As 
Nadia Milanova (2008, 1) argues, “the effectiveness of ethnicity as a political instrument 
                                                 
3 The remaining ‘protracted’ conflicts in Eurasia include Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Transnistria 
in Moldova. 
4 There have been four UN Security Council Resolutions concerning the situation in Nagorno Karabakh, namely 
UN Security Council Resolution 822, 30 April 1993; UN Security Council Resolution 853, 29 July 1993; UN 
Security Council Resolution 874, 14 October 1993; UN Security Council Resolution 884, 12 November 1993. 
Available at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/nagorny-karabakh/key-texts.php. In 2008, the UN General 
Assembly approved a resolution reaffirming Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and demanding the withdrawal of 
Armenian forces from the territories surrounding Nagorno Karabakh. An attempt on March 14, 2008, to pass a 
UN Security Council Resolution in the same direction failed, nevertheless, with votes against by the three Minsk 
Group Co-Chairs and Armenia among others, in recognition that the OSCE remains the legitimate venue to deal 
with the peace process. 
5 Declaration on State Independence of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic, January 6, 1992. Available at 
http://www.nkrusa.org/nk_conflict/declaration_independence.shtml#three. The designation Nagorno Karabakh 
Republic is used to refer to the self-designated authorities in the Nagorno Karabakh territory, and do not imply 
any sort of recognition of the region’s claims to independence. 4 
 
emanates from the emotional attachment of individuals to a group. This emotional attachment 
can also be projected through a sense of belonging to a territory, thus linking identity with 
territory”. As we will see below, the disputed conceptions of the historical presence of an 
ethnic group or the other in Karabakh lands remain at the heart of the conflict today. However, 
in order to account for the years of peaceful co-existence between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, 
it might be useful to retain a notion of ‘ethnicised conflict’ (Özkan 2008, 580), where the 
violent collapse of the structures of the Soviet Union and the consequent competition for power 
among elites led to an ethnic-based process of national consolidation. 
 
The dynamics sustaining this protracted conflict, as opposed to the often conveyed 
notion of “frozen”, are complex and range from individual-based to social, regional and global 
dynamics and evolve perceptions and power balances. The following sections put forward 
detailed information on these dynamics, in order to recognise the need to address them in a 
comprehensive view of the conflict. 
1.1.  Addressing Mutual Perceptions  
Historical accounts of the Armenian and Azerbaijani presence in Karabakh have been 
used to justify each side’s claim to the land (de Waal 2003, 145-158; ICG 2005, 3-6). From an 
early age, children are taught in school and by their families all the important dates in the 
development of their nation-states and the centrality of Karabakh on both accounts is a crucial 
factor (Veselý 2008). This shapes their ideas of the past and of the future in radically opposed 
and mutually excluding ways. Moreover, claims to the land have been advanced in historical 
terms more than political or economic (Milanova 2008, 4), leaving little room for innovative 
assessments of interests. The well established victor (Armenians) and victim (Azerbaijanis) 
identities have also made it harder to shift perceptions and establish points of departure for 
reconciliation. 
 
The military outcome of the conflict has also embodied important meanings for the 
process of nation-building in the three territories. For Armenians, the military victory over 
Azerbaijan allowed a heroic reassessment of a national history filled with episodes of defeat, 
loss of territory and statehood, of a victim mentality that the genocide issue reinforced.
6 It 
returned self-confidence and pride to Armenians all over the world and strengthened the 
                                                 
6 Armenians are engaged in an international campaign for the recognition of the mass killings by the Ottoman 
Turks, in 1915, as an act of genocide. 5 
 
national movement to restore Armenian statehood, after independence.
7 For the NKR, the 
military victory represented closure in a long history of autonomy, kept through several 
occupations, that is now very close to being consolidated.
8 Finally for Azerbaijan, it remains an 
obstacle in the process of developing a nationhood that is fairly recent, while posing a serious 
threat to its territorial integrity (Priego Moreno 2005).  
 
Thomas de Waal (2009) speaks of a “Karabakh trap” in which these deep settle 
identities become harder to renegotiate by the political leaders, since they become part of the 
societies’ self-image. Overcoming the zero-sum mentality, in which Armenian gains are 
Azerbaijani losses and vice-versa and focusing instead on long-term gains for all sides, 
including other regional actors that could act as peace-builders is crucial. CSOs working at the 
mid-level of society could have a real impact by promoting, supporting and diffusing examples 
of positive cooperation in economic, environmental and social areas. Moreover, linking CSOs 
dialogue and mediation activities to tangible peace-dividends is also a way to reinforce the 
impact of their actions (Mirimanova 2009, 25). 
 
The role of the media is a fundamental aspect in the formation of local perceptions. In 
the post-cease fire period, the media in both countries normalised its activity. This meant that, 
in Armenia, interest in the conflict diminished, reflecting the generalised belief that the war 
was over, while in Azerbaijan war propaganda made its way into the mainstream (Griporyan 
and Rzayev 2005). Today, the scenario has changed, with the media increasingly under state 
control in both countries. In Azerbaijan, state propaganda has been regarded as a legitimate 
instrument in the war-effort and has trickled down to the society, at times adding elements of 
xenophobia to the militarist rhetoric. Armenians have been particularly concerned about anti-
Armenian discourses, which they perceive as being sponsored at the highest level by 
Azerbaijani state authorities, including President Aliyev.
9 This same feeling is expressed by 
Armenians in Karabakh, who regard the Azerbaijani militarist propaganda as very dangerous 
and unconstructive to the peace process.
10 Azerbaijanis on the other hand underscore 
                                                 
7 In the words of Giorgi Derlugian (2003, 189) “For the Armenians, the question of Karabakh encapsulated all 
their historical sorrows and became the symbolic substitute for the much larger trauma of the 1915 genocide and 
the loss of historically Armenian lands that remained under Turkey’s control. Such a transposition seemed natural 
insofar as the Azeris shared with the Turks a closely related language and were Muslims ...”. 
8 Interview with David Babayan, Head of Information department, NKR Presidential Office, Stepanakert, April 7, 
2009.  
9 Interviews with CSOs, Yerevan, April 2009.  
10 Interviews with CSOs, Stepanakert/Khankendi, April 2009. 6 
 
Armenia’s unwillingness to deal with concrete concessions and their pre-established historical 
notions about the Karabakh territory as a fundamental obstacle to good relations.
11  
1.2.  Human Dynamics 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis live in total isolation of each other. Except for sporadic 
meetings by a small elite in third countries, societies in Armenia, Nagorno Karabakh and 
Azerbaijan have no regular contacts (Broers 2006). During the conflict Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis returned to their nations, abandoning the multi-ethnic societies they had formed 
and today it is virtually impossible to travel to the other side. Inside Nagorno Karabakh there 
are no Azerbaijanis left, making it a mono-ethnic society. Civil society initiatives figure 
prominently among the most important activities aimed at maintaining dialogue and exchange 
between Armenians (both in the Republic of Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh) and 
Azerbaijanis. They range across several thematic areas, such as women’s issues, youth 
meetings and media, but also track-two mediation, seminars, conferences, visits and fact-
finding missions. Although their impact on the achievement of a final solution has been very 
reduced and limited by the secret and top-down nature of the peace process, these activities 
remain crucial and illustrate a possibility of normality in relations with the other side, which 
can set out an example to the wider societies.  
 
Former combatants remain active players both at the political and civil society level, in 
Armenia, Karabakh and Azerbaijan. The most striking example is the current and former 
Armenian Presidents, who were both military leaders from Karabakh, actively engaged in the 
war with Azerbaijan. Similarly, in the Armenian society war veterans enjoy great respect and 
legitimacy and remain engaged in social activities, such as assistance to war victims and their 
families, or even educating young generations in military-patriotic tradition (Baghdasarian and 
Yunusov 2005). In Azerbaijan, due to the outcome of the war, veterans were regarded by the 
authorities with suspicion and their engagement in public activities has been limited.   
 
Among the population and civil society those defending a military solution to the 
conflict vary. In Armenia, most people regard the conflict as settled and therefore military 
presence is necessary to defend what are called the “liberated territories”. One of the most 
vocal organisations demanding a no-concession policy toward Azerbaijan is the Organisation 
                                                 
11 Interview with Azerbaijani official, Brussels, May 2009.  7 
 
in Defence of the Liberated Territories, whose leader Jarayir Sefilyan was also a commander 
for the special Shusha battalion (Abasov and Khachatrian 2006, 82).
12 A recently created 
movement, called Miatsum (unification), also with Sefilyan’s participation, continues this line 
of action (Avetisian 2008). In Azerbaijan, according to a 2004 survey, although a large 
majority of people prefer a peaceful solution to the conflict, they do not exclude the use of 
military means (Yerevan and Baku Press Clubs 2004), partly resonating the official speech. 
President Aliyev has often stated that Azerbaijan will use its new found oil wealth to overcome 
Armenia militarily and restore territorial integrity, eventually by force.
13 Radical groups inside 
Azerbaijan, such as the Karabakh Liberation Organisation, also remain active elements of the 
society with a significant destabilising power (Karpat 2005). Inside Karabakh, although recent 
years have restored some level of normalisation, with foreign investment, mainly from the 
Armenian Diaspora, and even economic growth, security and defence remain the main 
concerns of the population (Abasov and Khachatrian 2006, 84), making the military a central 
institution. 
 
The large population movements that took place with the war led to the dissolution of 
the multi-ethnic societies in Armenia and Azerbaijan, to create instead a pure Armenian society 
(with very few minorities) and an Azerbaijani society without Armenians. Although refugees 
and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are central to build sustainable peace, they have not 
been engaged in official negotiations. Azerbaijan has favoured a non-integration policy, 
keeping IDPs in provisory areas, and making no attempt to include them in the official 
mediation process, partly because the legitimacy of official representation of this vast group is 
disputed. Since 2006, the Azerbaijani government has initiated a program of resettlement of the 
IDPs in new housing facilities, built close to the front-line. In Armenia the number of refugees 
is smaller but still representing a social and economic risk.
14  
 
Most Armenian refugees leaving Azerbaijan before and during the war stayed in 
Karabakh or moved to the adjacent areas. Thus, it is inside Karabakh that the issue of the 
refugees and IDPs is harder, especially since there has been very little assistance to these 
                                                 
12 See also “Armenian veterans concerned at arrests over TV chief's murder”, Armenia Daily Digest, Yerevan, 7 
January 2003. http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/armenia/hypermail/200301/0009.shtml [02.11.2009]. 
13 “Azerbaijan may use force in Karabakh after Kosovo”, Reuters, March 4, 2008 
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL04930529 [02.11.2009]. 
14 According to Azerbaijani official numbers, in 2005 there were 686 586 IPs. Quoted in ICG (2007, 16). UNHCR 
numbers indicate around 260 000 refugees in Armenia. See UNHCR (2006).  8 
 
populations. Unofficial numbers indicate 30 000 refugees coming to Karabakh from Sumgait 
and Baku, as early as 1988-9.
15 In order to include them in the peace process and to address 
their needs, a needs-assessment should be conducted to identify who are the refugees and IDPs, 
what is their property and what happened to it.
16 
1.3.  Political Dynamics 
The current ‘no-war no-peace’ situation has been appropriated by local and external 
actors, looking to derive benefits from it. Instead of dealing with the situation, elites have 
avoided the issue of concessions and compromises to maximise their hold on power, while 
external actors have come to see the conflict as “frozen” and therefore representing minimal 
danger to their interests (Özkan 2008, 577). By portraying conflict dynamics and the incentive 
structure as “frozen”, all parts to the conflict and the international mediators have preserved the 
current status quo and have downplayed the fragility of the current cease-fire, as well as the 
dynamic nature of the conflict structure. At best, the only “frozen” aspect of this conflict is the 
peace process, and even that is radically changing. The brief war in South Ossetia, in August 
2008, and the ongoing process of normalisation of relations between Turkey and Armenia have 
forced a reassessment of interests by external actors. President Aliyev has repeatedly 
underlined the link in the normalisation of relations between Turkey and Armenia and the 
Nagorno Karabakh peace process.
17 By supporting more actively the Nagorno Karabakh peace 
process, Russia for instance reinforces its leadership in the region, namely by coming closer to 
Azerbaijan through energy deals, and establishing a more balanced position as regards the parts 
to the conflict (Giragosian 2009). The new Obama administration, on the other hand, is 
currently supporting a wider stabilisation process, where a peaceful solution to the Karabakh 
conflict is central.
18 The EU, which has defined transportation, energy and stability as 
fundamental interests in the region, has looked at the Nagorno Karabakh conflict with a new 
sense of urgency. Although there has not been widespread military confrontation between the 
sides for fifteen years, this remains an active conflict, making it harder to establish optimal 
strategies, suited to the conflict cycle.  
 
This situation has led to the discredit of the mediators and moderates inside conflict 
societies. Illustrating this, Azerbaijan occasionally seeks to move the peace process to other 
                                                 
15 Interview with Karabakhi refugee community leader, Shushi/ Shusha, April 7, 2009.  
16 Interview with Azerbaijani journalist, Baku, March 24, 2009.  
17 “Azerbaijan Seeks To Thwart Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement”, RFE/RL Caucasus Report, 6 April, 2009.  
18 “Turkey-Armenia peace focus of Barack Obama”, Hurriyet Daily News, 9 April, 2009. 9 
 
forums, where it feels it could have a better chance to review the current situation.
19 Armenia 
has so far been happy with the current negotiations, to the extent that the outcome of the war 
has not been revised and no unfavourable solution has been imposed on Armenians. However, 
inside Nagorno Karabakh people are very sceptical of the legitimacy of the OSCE Minsk 
Group and other external actors, such as the EU, to support a peaceful change to the current 
status quo, especially since Karabakhis have not been included in the peace process. Similarly, 
for many civil society actors and opposition parties advocating a peaceful settlement and the 
necessity of concessions on both sides, engaged in track-two mediation, dialogue and co-
operation across the front-line and within their societies, the time is also of frustration and 
discredit in the eyes of their communities. The lack of results and the highly controversial 
nature of their activities, often regarded as “unpatriotic”, have pushed them to marginal 
positions, without support from their own constituencies or external actors.  
 
The continuation of the conflict has hampered the democratic processes in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh. During the first years of independence from the Soviet 
Union, nationalistic mobilisations were associated with the war effort, taking time and energy 
away from the democratic process. This included unconditional and uncritical support for 
leaders, the channelling of national resources to the war effort and the privileging of military 
interests in external relations, ahead of political, social and economic issues. Today Armenia 
remains hostage to the economic blockades imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey, making 
economic development hard and highly dependent an external assistance, namely from Russia 
and the Armenian Diaspora. Such economic dependence has also carried a political price, to 
the extent that policy-making in Armenia has often been influenced by external interests, 
including from Karabakh, something that has worked as an obstacle to domestic pluralism. 
Both the opposition and the government have used the Nagorno Karabakh conflict for domestic 
political purposes more than they have attempted to reach a solution and in all, the presence of 
the conflict is usually presented as the main obstacle to democracy (International Crisis Group 
2007, 15).  
 
In Azerbaijan, the tendency to consolidate authoritarian power in the hands of the 
President and the surrounding elites has been driven both by the conflict and the oil revenues 
(Vorrath, et al 2007, Guliyev 2009). This combination can potentially become explosive as 
                                                 
19 Azerbaijan tried to move the peace process to the United Nations, in 2008, a move that was denounced by the 
OSCE Minsk group Co-chairs. See Alisayidov (2008).  10 
 
political elites make use of war rhetoric for political purposes, in a context of increasing 
military spending (Freizer 2008) and diminishing civic liberties. This state of affairs creates an 
autistic society, merged in apathy and uncommitted to peace or democracy, lenient on state 
opinions and decisions and deprived of the means to develop a critical assessment of its 
leaders’ performance.  
 
A similar narrative can be made in NKR, despite attempts by local political and civil 
society leaders to portray the regime as more democratic than in Azerbaijan or even in 
Armenia. The limitations of non-recognition bear on the pluralism of ideas in these non-
recognised entities (Lynch 2004, 42-54). Although the submission envisioned by Azerbaijan 
has not worked to its advantage, it has had a visible impact in today’s Karabakhi society. The 
lack of communication and the curtailing of all forms of co-operation with Azerbaijan have 
pushed Karabakh even further towards Armenian control and dependence. It is not only in its 
regional relations that non-recognition has an impact. Naturally, development opportunities are 
fewer under these conditions, while reconstruction of the devastated areas has been slow. 
Today Nagorno Karabakh has managed to develop some level of normality, including regular 
elections, assistance to the most vulnerable populations and increased control of the 
criminality. This could either support the peace process, developing democratic features and an 
open society, or could in fact remove the incentives for compromise. So far the opposition of 
Azerbaijan to include NKR in the official negotiations has prevented the Karabakhi society 
from having an official voice in settling their future, making any peace deal very fragile.  
 
2.  EU engagement with civil society in conflict resolution  
EU involvement in the civil society domain in Armenia and Azerbaijan has been very 
limited. Until the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was in place, the European 
Commission focused on the promotion of legislative reforms, strengthening the rule of law and 
democratic institutions in the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 
(PCA) and TACIS programme (EU-Armenia PCA 1999; EU-Azerbaijan PCA 1999). Overall, 
EU cooperation with these countries supported wide political reforms that would improve the 
context for civil society organisations and private entrepreneurs to take action. Nevertheless, 
within TACIS only a small percentage of total assistance was directed at civil society support, 
through the LIEN programme (Link Inter European NGOs), the Institution Building 11 
 
Partnership and the European Instrument on Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) (Raik 
2006, 17). 
 
A second stage of EU cooperation with Armenia and Azerbaijan was inaugurated with 
the European Neighbourhood Policy, increasing the potential for cooperation with CSOs in 
political and security issues, such as conflict resolution. The European Commission recognised 
the importance of strengthening the role of civil society in the ENP, through three major steps: 
strengthening dialogue between the EU and civil society; reinforcing community support to the 
civil society dimension; and improving public knowledge of the ENP and exchange of 
information (European Commission 2006). Individual ENP Action Plans also established goals 
dealing with conflict-resolution referring a “shared responsibility in conflict prevention and 
conflict resolution”. EU-Armenia and EU-Azerbaijan ENP Action Plans state the EU’s “strong 
commitment to support the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. [...]. The EU is ready 
to consider ways to strengthen further its engagement in conflict resolution and post conflict 
rehabilitation”. The proposals include support to the OSCE Minsk Group conflict settlement 
efforts; the possibility to provide EU support for humanitarian and de-mining initiatives; 
measures to assist refugees and IDPs; active involvement of civil society; and co-operation in 
support of conflict resolution with the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Southern 
Caucasus (EU-Armenia ENP Action Plan 2006, EU-Azerbaijan ENP Action Plan 2006). 
 
Civil society engagement with the EU in the framework of the ENP has mainly been 
conceived as a way of democratising and making governments more accountable. The process 
of negotiation of the Action Plans was seen as an opportunity for governments to consult with 
civil society actors, empowering them, while the monitoring of implementation of the Action 
Plans should further reinforce this process. However, the outcomes in Armenia and Azerbaijan 
were below the expectations, with CSOs marginalised by government officials, something the 
EU did not manage to prevent (Alieva 2006, 10-11). The EU did set up a feedback mechanism 
for CSOs from the partner countries to contribute to the annual ENP Action Plan 
implementation report, and further engagement will be sought during the negotiation of 
Association Agreements under the Eastern Partnership  (EaP) initiative (see further details 
below). 
 
2.1.  Financial Instruments 12 
 
Although the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) makes clear 
reference to CSOs, not only as potential beneficiaries of EU funding, but also as partners in 
strategic planning and programming of EU external assistance, clear mechanisms and concrete 
measures on how to implement this participation are still missing (Ljubljana Declaration 2008). 
Funding under the ENPI is divided between National and Regional Programmes, managed by 
the European Commission delegations on the ground and EuporeAid, in Brussels, respectively. 
The delegations manage smaller projects, namely the calls for the EIDHR and other financial 
instruments dealing with civil society (see below for more details).  
 
Since the ENP is in place, the EU has made more vocal statements on the importance of 
including civil society in the process of democracy building in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and 
has increased the lines of financing available for cooperation with civil society actors. Through 
the ENPI and the reformed EIDHR, the EU has increased direct financial assistance to the 
development of CSO capacity,
20 though there is no explicit mentioning in the Action Plans of 
an increased role for civil society in conflict resolution. By 2008, the European Commission 
put out the first call for projects to be financed under EIDHR and Non-State Actors and Local 
Authorities Development (NSALA) programme, in Azerbaijan. This was the first time the EU 
created the possibility to directly finance CSOs in Azerbaijan. Both programmes are under DG 
RELEX responsibility and are managed by EuropeAid. They include geographical coverage 
and thematic programmes such as NSALA, which is replacing since 2007, the NGO co-
funding and Decentralised Co-operation programmes.  
 
The main goal of these budget lines is to build capacity among civil society in 
development contexts. The projects being financed in Azerbaijan under these two instruments 
deal mostly with capacity-building for local actors, awareness-raising and coordination and 
communication (NSALA), as well as human rights protection and electoral monitoring 
(EIDHR) (EuropeAid 2009). In a broad sense these activities aim at improving the capacities 
of CSOs and to improve the general context for action in domestic environments. However, 
they do not address issues of conflict resolution or conflict transformation.
21 Moreover, while 
the NSALA 2008 Action Programme indicates that the priority should be for small-scale 
initiatives originating from CSOs in the EU and partner countries, with budgets around 50 000 
                                                 
20 Under EIDHR, the heading transnational and regional activities include civil society in democracy and human 
rights promotion, conflict mediation and political participation. See EIDHR calls for proposals at 
ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/worldwide/EIDHR  
21 Interview with EU officials at EuropeAid Co-operation office, May 3
rd, 2009, Brussels.  13 
 
Euros (Annual Action Programme for Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in Development 
2008), of the three projects approved in Azerbaijan, two are run by foreign organisations and 
the budgets are of more than 400 000 and 250 000 Euros each (EuropeAid 2009). The choice 
to finance such large-sized projects reflects the criteria used by the European Commission, 
privileging well written projects and reliable partners.
22 These are still major difficulties for 
local CSOs. However, the EU should be aware of the difficulties by local CSOs to match the 
EU’s standards and aim at capacity-building. 
 
Under DG RELEX, the Instrument for Stability (IfS) is another possibility for EU 
support to civil society in conflict resolution processes. The IfS includes a Crisis Response 
Component aimed at short-term action on conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Under this 
initiative the EU established the Peace-building Partnership (PbP), with a global scope (no 
specific geographic focus) and aiming to mobilize and consolidate civilian expertise on peace-
building issues, by working with selected partner groups.
23 Most of the CSOs engaged in this 
initiative, however come from the EU and display large capacity, making it harder for local 
CSOs to compete under this initiative.
24 Under this component there has been a call for the 
organisation of roundtables, which could be used by local CSOs working on the Nagorno 
Karabakh conflict, but this seems to be more of token gesture that an important element in 
engaging the EU in conflict resolution. Under the long-term component, one of the priorities is 
to enhance pre- and post-crisis preparedness, including investing in implementation partners 
such as international, regional and sub-regional organisations, state and non-state actors. This 
could be put into action once an agreement has been reached.  
 
There are also procedural issues currently obstructing a more streamline used of the IfS 
assistance, which runs through calls for projects. This means that the European Commission 
does not control the themes or quality of projects being proposed and depends on the 
organisations applying for funding to put forward conflict-related themes. Overall, EU action 
on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict has remained very dependent on the stimuli emerging from 
the ground, and although IfS does not require the formal agreement of states to be 
implemented, the EU seeks agreement before deploying these measures.
25  
 
                                                 
22 Interview with EU officials at EuropeAid Co-operation office, May 3
rd, 2009, Brussels.  
23 Information available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/ifs_en.htm   
24 Email exchange with EC official, DG Relex, 30 September 2008. 
25 Interview with EC officials, DG Relex, May 7, 2009, Brussels. 14 
 
A large part of the European presence in both Armenia and Azerbaijan still relies on the 
member states’ national development agencies. This hampers coherence. However, since 2008, 
and responding to both countries’ wish to have relations with the EU upgraded, the European 
Commission opened two full-fledged delegations in Yerevan and Baku. This move also made 
it easier for the EU to identify local partners within civil society, making the EU more aware of 
the circumstances in which CSOs operate, their limitations and their efforts to become active 
players in conflict prevention and conflict resolution. European Commission delegations are 
central instruments in the design and implementation of EU assistance and in its diplomatic 
efforts to sustain assistance with political will. They would be privileged interlocutors in the 
implementation of any CBMs that might be approved. Because both delegations are rather 
young and understaffed and their representatives are still in the process of gaining access to 
and the trust of domestic interlocutors, they have still to gain full operational capacity. 
  
2.2.  Regional initiatives 
In its communication of 2007 intituled “Black Sea Synergy” (European Commission 
2007), the European Commission supported the development of networks of NGOs dealing 
with conflict issues around the Black Sea. Aiming to enhance the role of the ENP on conflict 
resolution, the Black Sea Peace Building Network was established, bringing together the Crisis 
Management Initiative and local NGOs. Funding for this imitative has come from EU member 
states such as the United Kingdom, through DFID, or the German International Foundations 
(Crisis Management Initiative 2007). Along with the ENPI, instruments such as the Cross 
Border Cooperation programme for the Black Sea basin (CBC-BS), which is directed at 
improving economic and social development in the region, with a focus on local actors and the 
Black Sea Forum (BSF) or the Community of Democratic Choice (CDC), all have important 
civil society dimensions. There is a certain reluctance to engage in discussions of regional 
policies for supporting civil society in conflict resolution, as these formats are seen as having 
limited impact in solving the conflicts and civil society, though important, is too small to have 
a lasting influence (Crisis Management Initiative 2007). Moreover, there is a gap between the 
EU’s long-term approach of democracy building and the short-term, reactive attitude of the 
ENP partners.  
 
Under the recently created Eastern Partnership (EaP) the EU has the potential to engage 
further with civil society. The EaP envisions a closer cooperation at the bilateral level between 
the EU and partners countries, providing the possibility of further reforms. According to EU 15 
 
officials, the EaP seeks to provide a new impetus to multilateral initiatives, which the EU 
hopes can contribute to regional cooperation and confidence-building in its Eastern 
neighbourhood. Azerbaijan has refrained from participation in most of the regional initiatives 
involving Armenia; however, there are signs that the Azerbaijani leadership might also be 
concerned with its international image as a blocking force and could be more willing to 
engage. Should the EU move forward with the implementation of CBMs in the Nagorno 
Karabakh conflict, civil society organisations could act under this multilateral initiative, under 
regional priority number 1, democracy promotion and stability.
26  
 
As far as the Civil Society Forum is concerned, it is being thought of as a “flexible and 
open network of EU and Eastern Partnership civil society, meeting once a year and operating 
via working groups and teams which would address specific topics and issue proposals for 
programmes and projects to secure the partnership's objectives” (European Economic and 
Social Committee 2009a). The European Economic and Social Committee has specifically 
called for greater civil society engagement in conflict resolution with EU support (European 
Economic and Social Committee 2009b). To kick-start the Civil Society Forum, the European 
Commission issued an “Invitation to contribute to an opinion on the Eastern Partnership 
Forum” (European Commission 2009) for CSOs in the EaP and EU countries. An EaP Civil 
Society Forum is scheduled for Brussels on 16-17 November 2009.  
2.3.  Conflict prevention and crisis management 
The EU has also focused increasingly on conflict prevention, following the Gotenburg 
report (European Council 2001). The programme envisioned an integrated approach to conflict 
prevention, working both on the structural causes of violence, including through the 
strengthening of democracy and human rights situations world-wide, using the EIDHR and the 
ENP Action Plans (Council of the European Union 2006) and operational prevention, through 
the development of the EU civilian crisis management, ESDP missions, and cooperation with 
international partners such as the UN, the OSCE and other regional intergovernmental bodies. 
Civil society engagement was underscored as an important contribution to conflict prevention, 
especially in early warning, although co-operation throughout all the conflict phases was 
deemed crucial. However, work is needed to mainstream conflict prevention and increase 
dialogue promotion between governments and their societies, as part of the EU’s governance 
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approaches to conflict (EPLO 2006, 38). Moreover, EU instruments for crisis management and 
early warning can also be deployed as support tools for the ongoing mediation process, in that 
they can improve the EU’s contribution to making international guarantees to the conflict 
parties more credible (Herrberg et al 2009, 18). This is particularly relevant as the peace 
process around Nagorno Karabakh has reached a critical stage, where international mediation 
must push through concrete commitments by the conflict parties (Sarkisyan 2009). 
 
The EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus is perhaps the most visible EU 
initiative as regards conflict transformation. The high profile post was created in 2003 and is 
held, since 2006, by the Swedish Ambassador Peter Semenby. The mandate of the EUSR 
provides for functions of support to peace efforts, including through the implementation of 
reforms envisioned in the ENP. The EUSR has maintained close contacts with CSOs in 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh, although he has failed to visit Nagorno Karabakh 
personally, having instead sent his Political Advisors, who visited the region for the first time 
in June 2007.
27 This has been interpreted in Karabakh as a double standard of the EU, which 
has been fully engaged in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and as a proof of the pressure exercised 
by Azerbaijani officials on the EU’s approach to conflict resolution in Karabakh. 
 
2.4.  Overview 
EU engagement in the Nagorno Karabakh peace process has increased over the last 
years, mainly through the institutionalisation of an informal mediation role, partly derived from 
France’s presence in the official mediation process, acting as a Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk 
Group, but also from other EU member states’ participation in the group’s enlarged format.
28 
Today, the EUSR for the South Caucasus is a central actor in the region, closely working with 
the Minsk Group Co-Chairs and the European Commission delegations in Baku and Yerevan 
to monitor developments on the ground and providing crucial updated information to the EU, 
as well as establishing important links to local actors. It is therefore crucial that an increased 
EU presence in the mediation process does not overburden it or eventually increases lack of 
coordination (Svensson 2009, 11). Moreover, the EU’s financial instruments can provide 
crucial support to long-term changes in conflict societies, contributing to transformative, long-
term mediation (Herrberg et al. 2009, 13), which could work as a complement to the current 
                                                 
27 Interview with EU Council Secretariat official and EUSR Political Advisor, Brussels, May 2009  
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power-based mediation, and favour the development of a wider reconciliation process among 
and within societies (Gahramanova 2007, 46).  
 
EU official priorities towards the conflict are clear: first, prevent armed conflict; 
second, stop the war rhetoric; and third provide all necessary support to keep the negotiations 
active.
29 EU official policy underlines that the Minsk Group is the main format for negotiations 
and the EUSR’s mandate is to support official mediation efforts, not replace them.
30 The EU is 
considering the development of CBMs which would focus on media and youth, inside Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, as well as on the development of people-to-people contacts between the two 
sides.
31 Civil society actors stand as privileged partners in these plans. However, real progress 
in the peace talks is a pre-condition for further engagement with civil society on conflict-
related issues including the CBMs. As one European Commission official has put it “without 
advances in track-one mediation, there can be no track-two or track-three successful 
engagement. Civil society alone will not solve the conflict”.
32 Furthermore, the European 
Commission is also concerned about how more engagement with civil society would be 
perceived by both governments. As one European Commission official in the region put it: 
“The EU is not in the process of funding revolutions!”
33 This perception reflects the growing 
efforts of the EU in developing independent and respected delegations in Azerbaijan and 
Armenia, and illustrates how far political leaders are willing to use the conflict for domestic 
political purposes, making discussions on this issue a highly politicised matter.  
 
Any EU policy towards the Nagorno Karabakh conflict has also to overcome internal 
divisions inside the EU, in terms of interests and priorities. From the interviews with EU 
officials it was clear that the European Commission has been pushing for a greater role of the 
EU in the peace process, which could include a EU presence in the Minsk Group or the 
establishment of formal channels of communication with the Minsk Group Co-chairs, since 
consultation is made in an ad hoc fashion. However, in the Council this perception is more 
cautious. Although most member states feel there is a new momentum and more urgency in 
addressing the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, any changes to the Minsk Group are not welcomed, 
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this interpretation.  
31 Interview with EC official, DG RELEX, Desk Officer, Brussels, May 2009.  
32 Interview with EC official, DG RELEX, Desk Officer, Brussels, May 2009. 
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and thus the EU would keep a back seat. Another such example is the difficult co-ordination of 
EU and member states interests in the Caspian region, namely in dealing with Azerbaijan. 
Energy security is a central priority for both the Commission and the member states, limiting 
their options of engagement and making political stability a central concern for investors. 
Member states also have their own interests, policies and programmes in Azerbaijan and often 
they leave EU policies for second plan.  
3.  Civil society working on conflict resolution in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno 
Karabakh 
Below there is a list of CSOs interviewed, from mid and grassroots level in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh. 
  
Armenia  Azerbaijan  Nagorno Karabakh 
1 Think Tank  1 Research Centre  1 Think Tank 
1 Business Association  1 Self-help Initiative  1 Business Association 
1 Training CSO  1 individual citizen  1 Training CSO 
1 individual citizen  1 Students’ Group  1 Women’s Group 
1 Media CSO  1 Religious Organisation  1 Religious Organisation 
  2 Funding Organisations  1 Media Organisation 
  2 Media Organisations  1 Activist 
 
3.1. Types of Activities 
During the 1990s, following the cease-fire, local CSOs in Armenia and Azerbaijan got 
engaged in activities related to conflict resolution, often with support from international 
donors. An explicit feature of these activities was to cultivate dialogue between the parties to 
the conflict, including inside Nagorno Karabakh. This facilitated the development of CSOs 
across the region, with prominent examples such as the Yerevan, Baku and Stepanakert Press 
Clubs, the first independent media groups to emerge after the collapse of the USSR. Another 
well-known organisation present in the region is the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly (HCA) with 
branches in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Karabakh. Both the Press Clubs and the HCA work as 
umbrella organisations, providing support for grassroots organisations, looking to strengthen 
independent voices in the  region and to contribute to the pacification and free development of 
regional societies, including though contributions to conflict resolution. They were engaged in 19 
 
peace caravans, journalists’ meetings, surveys and track-two mediation efforts, among other 
activities (Hasanov and Ishkanian 2005). 
 
However, the lack of results at the political level deteriorated the context in which 
CSOs could contribute to conflict transformation and conflict resolution. The consolidation of 
the status quo has led, in Armenia, to a tendency to regard the conflict over Karabakh as de 
facto settled. The Armenian government policy regarding civil society engagement in conflict 
resolution has shifted from a strictly elite-dominated process, to regard civil society 
engagement as useful, at best, and harmless, at worst. This could lead most CSOs to divert 
their priorities to development-based activities. However, this trend is counterbalanced by the 
fact that it is easier for CSOs to work on conflict resolution issues in Armenia. In Azerbaijan, 
often one organisation will combine activities on democracy promotion and human rights 
education with peaceful conflict transformation, reflecting an adaptation to the increasingly 
dangerous situation for peace activists, and for those CSOs dealing with highly politicised 
issues (Human Rights Center of Azerbaijan and  Azerbaijan National Committee of the 
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights 2004). This included running the risk of 
being physically endangered or subverting the role of civil society exclusively for conflict 
resolution purposes, when there was mounting evidence that both sides (Armenia and 
Azerbaijan) were using civil society in their nationalist propaganda. One way to circumvent 
this situation has been to resort to human rights reports as vehicles to expose violent conflict-
related action and to advocate non-violence (Weiss and Nazarenko 1997, 8).
  
  
Conflict-related activities, such as inter-communal dialogue, peace education and track-
two mediation efforts are still common in the region. The Yerevan Press Club (YPC) has 
conducted a series of research projects, conferences and surveys dealing with public 
perceptions of the Karabakh conflict, in collaboration with the Press Clubs in Baku and 
Stepanakert.
34 In Azerbaijan, similar projects have been carried by the International Centre for 
Social Research (ICSR), including surveys on public opinion regarding the peace process and 
media monitoring.
35 One of the most widely known television programmes, both in Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, is the TV Bridge programme, managed by Internews Azerbaijan, which brings 
                                                 
34 Two important projects include “Karabakh Conflict in the Mirror of Media and Public Opinion in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Mountainous Karabakh”, in cooperation with the Baku and Stepanakert Press Clubs, conducted in 
2001 and in 2003-04 a second bilateral project named “Possible Resolutions to the Karabakh Conflict: Expert 
Evaluations and Media Coverage”, was carried in cooperation with the Baku Press Club, which resulted in a 
publication gathering experts from the two countries (Aliev, et al. 2006) 
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together Armenian and Azerbaijani politicians, diplomats, members of political parties, cultural 
figures and specialists exchanging views on both countries’ relations. Further activities include 
second-track mediation and confidence-building initiatives, such as those linked to the 
Dortmund Conference (Gahramanova 2006, 182; Poghosyan 2009, 19) and the Consortium 
Initiative.
36 Working with partners in the region to contribute to positive conflict 
transformation and conflict resolution, the Consortium initiative was set up in 2003, bringing 
together International Alert, Conciliation resources and LINKS. Conciliation Resources has 
also been engaged in the project Dialogue through Film, bringing together Azerbaijanis and 
Armenian Karabakhis, in collaboration with Internews Armenia, Internews Azerbaijan and the 
Stepanakert Press Club. However, the extent to which such initiatives comprise a sustainable 
effort of civil society towards peace can be questioned, as elements of local CSOs participating 
in such initiatives seem to sustain hard-line positions (International Crisis Group 2009, 11).  
 
Inside Nagorno Karabakh conflict resolution remains a priority. This is natural for a 
society aiming to live a fully recognised existence and to overcome the limitations of the 
current context, which makes them highly dependent on external funding and on foreign 
donors’ priorities. CSOs also display a tendency to be less specialised in their activities, 
frequently dealing with human rights and democracy promotion as part of their conflict 
transformation approach, as well as a tendency to address both the causes and the symptoms of 
the conflict (promoting dialogue, forums, meetings and supporting families and prisoners of 
war, for instance). Because Nagorno Karabakh is a small society, CSOs are closer to the 
grassroots and it is easier to reach the average citizen in their initiatives. In contrast, CSOs 
have more difficulties in reaching the international community and to make their concerns, 
needs and suggestions heard. There are, nevertheless, examples of how the presence of 
international donors has created space for civil society to participate in official mediation 
processes, including the promotion of Karabakh CSOs meetings with the co-chairs of the 
Minsk Group,
37 or the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus’ advisors.  
 
Choosing to address either the symptoms or the causes of the conflict depends mostly 
on the context for action. While in the 1990s, addressing the symptoms of war was an 
emergency, leading to the prevalence of activities regarding refugees
38, prisoners of war
39 and 
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families of the victims of war;
40 with time CSOs have started to address the causes, mainly 
through dialogue, debate, policy research and exchange within and across societies. There are 
also situations, inside Karabakh, where CSOs will focus on development activities, departing 
from the view point that the war has been solved for fifteen years and now it is time to provide 
opportunities for economic development.
41 Like in Karabakh, in Azerbaijan, there is a balance 
in activities dealing with the causes (training, capacity-building and education aimed at re-
articulating stereotypes and perceptions of the other) and the symptoms of the conflict (focus 
on economic assistance to the refugee communities, through self-help initiatives, mediation 
among the communities and support capacity-building among refugees). These activities have 
been regarded as positive developments by the authorities and therefore have not been 
considered as threatening the position of the regime in the negotiation process.  
 
Pursuing conflict transformation through adversarial activities has become a risky 
business in the Caucasus. Due to the relatively more plural public space in Armenia, CSOs 
have raised public awareness at grassroots level, elites and media through surveys, discussion 
clubs, and publications, raising the costs of the status quo, exposing vested interests in the 
current state of affairs. The International Centre for Human Development (ICHD), one of the 
most well known Armenian think tanks, has complemented its traditionally elite-oriented 
activities with work at the grass-roots level, aimed at mainstreaming “invisible” opinions in the 
Armenian society and at providing information on the peace process to the wider population.
42 
This represents an important change on how civil society seeks to better integrate different 
perceptions on the conflict and facilitate intra-social dialogue. Most of the activities conducted 
by the organisations interviewed in Azerbaijan, on the other hand, are non-adversarial, aiming 
to promote change in society. The few potentially adversarial activities include the raise of 
public awareness of conflict issues in the media
43 and international advocacy,
44 although 
threats and violent action against journalists and activists in Azerbaijan has developed some 
level of self-censorship and a climate of intimidation and fear. There were cases where CSOs 
had to abandon more vocal activities of an adversarial nature, including raising awareness on 
the conflict and denunciating, to favour non-adversarial activities, focusing on policy research 
                                                                                                                                                          
39 Interview CSOs, Baku, March 2009, Yerevan and Stepanakert/Khankendi, April 2009. 
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41 Interview CSO, Stepanakert/Khankendi, April 2009. 
42 Interview, Yerevan, April 2009. 
43 Interview CSO, Baku, March 2009 
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with a regional focus. This illustrates the difficulties inherent to the limited democracy enjoyed 
inside in the region, including in Nagorno Karabakh.
45 
 
3.2.  CSO Impact  
The impact of local CSOs activities can be thought of in three main ways: peace-
building, holding the status quo, and fuelling the conflict (Tocci 2008). To the extent that 
CSOs still conduct conflict-related activities, most will portray them as aiming at peace-
building, including activities dealing with discursive transformation of identities, roles and 
perceptions and dialogue across the frontline. Such activities have been favoured by 
international donors working in the region, since the cease-fire, although the lack of tangible 
results in conflict resolution has led to some discredit of this approach, especially in 
Azerbaijan, where the outcome of the conflict is unfavourable. Armenian organisations, on the 
other hand, find it easier than their Azerbaijani counterparts to engage in conflict-related 
activities with bilateral character. Most CSOs interviewed inside Karabakh present a more 
conciliatory approach, working both inside the Karabakhi society to change perceptions, 
addressing radical views and working as well across societies, with Azerbaijani counterparts. 
However, this is possible because CSOs in Karabakh depart from the position of victors of the 
conflict and do not open the possibility of revising the outcomes of the war. Instead they 
propose activities that could facilitate peace under the existing status quo, which can have, at 
best, a holding effect on the conflict dynamics and at worst fuel conflict by removing any 
serious possibility of a mutually acceptable peace.  
 
Holding activities “affect the material and psychological symptoms of conflict rather 
than its underlying causes” (Tocci 2008, 18), affecting long-term conflict dynamics. Such 
activities include those looking to address the symptoms of economic isolation of Armenia, 
which Azerbaijan perceives as a central strategy in the conflict. Much like in Nagorno 
Karabakh, the argument should be made that this strategy of isolation has been ineffective in 
pushing Armenia to concede its position and has strengthened radical groups in the country, as 
previously discussed. Such groups although promoting the status quo might end up fuelling the 
conflict as impatience with and discredit of peace-building activities increases. Assistance to 
refugee and IDP communities can potentially have one of two effects. On the one hand, by 
providing palliative assistance one can reduce the incentive for an active engagement by these 
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communities in having their rights acknowledged. The right of the Azerbaijani Karabakhi 
community to an active voice in the peace process has been questioned, although the 
Azerbaijani government has promoted the formation of a coherent Azerbaijani refugee/IDP 
community from Karabakh, which could counterbalance the pressure made by Armenian 
Karabakhis in the peace process (Abbasov 2009). Thus, activities aimed at assisting refugee 
communities to integrate in the society and to develop social skills, instead of consolidating the 
status quo, can contribute to significant changes in the social fabric and empower the voices of 
those most directly affected by the conflict, eventually contributing to change. Similarly, 
organisations dedicated to development activities, including at the level of grassroots,
46 
business communities
47, as well as assistance and economic opportunities (especially with 
Azerbaijan), could play a crucial role inside Nagorno Karabakh society in removing a sense of 
isolation and make them more open to cooperation as well.  
 
Such examples are particularly important since the credibility of the security guarantees 
offered by the international community to Nagorno Karabakh have been questioned, in the face 
of Azerbaijan’s increasing militarist rhetoric. The government, in Baku, seems to have filled a 
fuelling function in society, legitimising a wide-spread support for more radical positions. The 
radicalisation of Azerbaijani official positions has limited civil society’s space to portray 
peaceful conflict resolution as a priority. Several problems were identified by civil society 
actors limiting the impact of their activities in conflict resolution. Situations of politicisation of 
research activities and confidence-building measures raising issues of trust and acceptable 
language;
48 lack of public acknowledgement of the achievements of civil society initiatives, 
including by public officials;
49 lack of sustainability of the processes being developed; and the 
existing restrictions on media freedom were all indicated as major obstacles in the process of 
overcoming stereotypes and develop knowledge of the other side, beyond official rhetoric. 
 
In spite of the relatively free environment inside Nagorno Karabakh for CSOs to 
operate and influence government decisions, their capability to impact the conflict dynamics is 
limited by the fact that the NKR authorities are not officially part to the peace negotiations. 
The need to build trust, common knowledge and develop the opportunities for increased 
positive contact between the Azerbaijani and Karabakhi societies is widely recognised as a 
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fundamental premise for any peace agreement to be regarded as legitimate and to be accepted 
by the population. This is particularly important to assure that the return of refugees can be 
made in a context of stability, where the main sources of tension and grievances have been 
addressed. In this context, CSOs from Nagorno Karabakh have voiced their critics to the 
approach of the Minsk Group and its attempt to impose the Madrid principles on Nagorno 
Karabakh without taking their views into consideration. Recognising these obstacles the Minsk 




3.3.  CSO Effectiveness 
Traditionally, CSOs actions have greater visibility and impact in the domestic context if 
there is support from the government structures. This can include the participation of officials 
in CSOs activities, the non-obstruction of their work or even financial and logistic support. 
However, in the context of the Karabakh conflict, CSOs face a delicate balancing act, between 
accepting/needing state support to improve their credibility and the dangers of co-option. 
Illustrations of this dilemma, in Armenia, include state officials attempt to control CSOs’ 
activities, as well as lack of understanding as to how civil society can assist the government in 
the peace process, and inversely how the state can assist civil society.
51 As a consequence, 
CSOs who are protective of their independence often lose the support of state officials, making 
their activities less visible internationally and less legitimate domestically. In Azerbaijan, many 
organisations recognised that personal connections to state officials facilitated their work and 
increased their ability to achieve good results, namely by removing suspicion. The Azerbaijani 
government has also become an important civil society financer, through the state Fund to 
Support NGOs, established in 2008, with a budget of 1.5 million AZN (Azerbaijani Manats) to 
fund NGO activities (USAID 2008, 57). Nevertheless, the risk of co-option and self-censorship 
exists, considering the official speech from the Azerbaijani authorities aimed at maintaining the 
conflict resolution process at the high political level.  
The authorities in NKR regard civil society development with interest, considering their 
goals of developing a pluralist society,
52 in line with the official policy of portraying NKR as a 
democratic “country”.
53 There are no major interferences in the registration processes of 
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CSOs
54 and usually support from external donors is a good way to safeguard CSOs from local 
interference. Moreover, government officials often participate in CSOs activities, displaying 
their support.
55 However, the government also wants to avoid strong CSOs from developing, so 
as not to jeopardise their power positions. Close contacts with government authorities thus 
remain crucial to enhance CSOs effectiveness, since there are few resources available outside 
the spectrum of the government.  
 
Relations with the local communities can also enhance or limit the effectiveness of 
CSOs actions. Generally there is a tendency by local communities in Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Karabakh to regard contacts with the other side with suspicion, reflecting the manipulation of 
the conflict in domestic politics. However, whenever activities are openly promoted and 
engagement with other CSOs is sought, it becomes easier to harness support for these 
activities,
56 as well as whenever personal capacity inside the organisation was high.
57 Due to 
their size, most CSOs in Nagorno Karabakh work closely to the grassroots, increasing their 
rootedness and legitimacy, although the lack of financial resources is forcing CSOs to resort to 
voluntary work, limiting the quality of their activities.
58 Therefore, the professionalization of 
CSOs or the work with experts and professionals improves the ability of CSOs to impact the 
conflict, as does the development of networks at the national, regional and international level. 
This works as a way to overcome limitations of resources, enhancing effectiveness and impact 
and providing greater visibility and coherence to public actions. It improves interconnectedness 
(the horizontal level) as well as visibility (at the vertical level) of CSOs work. In Azerbaijan, 
examples provided in the interviews show that competition among CSOs remains a problem to 
their effectiveness. CSOs compete for funding, ideas and access to information, creating poor 
communication, overlapping and limited synergies.  
 
Financial and political support by external actors is crucial for civil society to stay 
engaged in conflict-related issues, since it enhances the visibility of the organisations. 
Currently, there are difficulties to gather funding at a time when most donors are re-evaluating 
their financial priorities. The diminution of grant sizes has left mid-level Armenian 
organisations with relatively big dimension in the position of competing with external 
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organisations for grants from foreign governments. Their local partners also suffer due to the 
lack the resources to keep supporting smaller grassroots organisations.
59 There is also an added 
difficulty in getting donors engaged in the promotion of long-term projects aimed at conflict 
transformation, as opposed to conflict resolution, since results are not immediate. Moreover, 
the priority of international donors, including the EU, seems to have shifted towards 
democracy and human rights, and away from conflict-related activities. CSOs in Nagorno 
Karabakh are highly dependent on international actors to provide in-put to the peace process. 
The need to build trust, common knowledge and develop the opportunities for increased 
positive contact between the Azerbaijani and Karabakhi societies is particularly important to 
assure that the return of refugees can be made in a context of stability, where the main sources 
of tension and grievances have been addressed.  
 
However, dependence of external funding can also marginalise CSOs and portray them 
as co-opted and, in extreme cases, as traitors, especially when the society is polarised. 
Impositions in terms of agenda by foreign donors, pushing for reconciliation and dialogue has 
left local CSOs in fragile security conditions and has alienated them from the wider public. In 
other cases, the lack of funds has limited the scope of action undertaken by local CSOs.
60 One 
central issue mentioned in the interviews was donors’ priorities for regional formats (including 
Georgia or Turkey) as opposed to bilateral (Armenian-Azerbaijani) ones.
61 Although this has 
allowed for more projects to be developed, as they usually are not opposed by any of the parts 
and participants feel more comfortable in these diluted formats, bilateral meetings have the 
potential to be more intensive and deal with hard issues in more depth, potentially reaching 
more sustainable and visible results in conflict-related issues. Similarly, Diaspora funding also 
brings a nationalistic agenda close to governmental priorities.
62 Diversification of sources 
would facilitate the development of CSOs working on conflict-related activities, but also 
human rights and democratisation, or addressing specific problems such as refugee issues.  
 
Specific contextual factors can also enhance or curtail the efficiency of CSOs action in 
conflict resolution. In Azerbaijan, the official policy limits civil society engagement in conflict 
resolution or conflict transformation. Moreover, indirect impact on the conflict has also been 
limited by the deteriorating environment on civic liberties, in the period leading to the 
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presidential elections, in 2008. The media has been particularly targeted, several newspapers 
were closed and journalists have been harassed, while police investigations have delivered little 
progress (United States Department of State 2009). CSOs in Armenia considered that it 
become easier to deal with conflict-related issues following the war in South Ossetia, in 2008. 
The war changed not only the way international actors regarded the status of the conflicts in 
the South Caucasus, but also the way local actors perceived their military options. This meant 
that the importance of engaging societies along with the elites in finding sustainable solutions 
to the conflict became more pronounced. This much was also recognised by the Minsk Group 
co-chairs, since they also reinforced their attention to civil society actions (Khachatrian 2009). 
The recent Turkish-Armenian process of normalising relations also raised high expectations 
among Armenian civil society that the Azerbaijani authorities would soften their position and 
would embrace wider formats for dialogue, namely the ENP and the Caucasus Stability and 
Cooperation Platform.
63 Finally, since the elections of February 2008 in Armenia and the 
violent repression of protesters, both the opposition and the government have used the conflict 
for domestic political purposes making it harder to distinguish between a serious effort at peace 
and political manipulation. 
4.  EU impact  
The EU has financed NGOs in Armenia since 2004, though none of the projects is 
directly aimed at peace-building.
64 The EIDHR has also been available to Armenian CSOs 
since 2004, and there have been at least two important projects with potential impact on 
conflict dynamics. One was managed by the Association of Investigating Journalists, with the 
name “Armenia & Azerbaijan on the Crossroads of neither peace no war” and the other was 
managed by the International Centre for Human Development, with the name “Towards new 
leadership: Measures facilitating the peaceful conciliation of groups’ interests”. Further 
projects under EIDHR have focused on improvement of media standards (one of the most 
notorious initiative is the Cross Caucasus Journalism Network, implemented by Institute for 
War and Peace Reporting, which includes journalists from Nagorno Karabakh), human rights 
protection, local government and elections, which can at best have an indirect impact in the 
conflict dynamics. EU engagement with civil society in Azerbaijan is very recent. The first 
grants for CSOs were attributed in late 2008 and are now being implemented. In the framework 
of the ENP, the ENPI and the EIDHR have become available to support civil society 
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development, while the establishment of concrete priorities for Azerbaijan in the ENP Action 
Plan, including conflict resolution, democracy promotion and human rights, created the 
possibility to push for reforms that can improve the general context within which CSOs 
operate.  
 
Inside NKR, there are no projects run by local civil society organisations currently 
being funded or supported in any way by the EU. Even as the EU considers CBMs for the 
Karabakh conflict it aims mainly to engage Armenian and Azerbaijani societies, while having 
no plans to engage with the authorities in Karabakh. The current staff in the European 
Commission delegations in Yerevan and Baku has never visited the region, and although the 
EIDHR, the NSALA and the IfS all allow EU support to countries and regions without local 
government consent (in the Karabakh case this would mean Azerbaijani permission), the EU 
has refrained from embarking on activities that could harm the current negotiations or could 
provoke harsh reaction by local governments. There have been, however, two visits, one by an 
European Commission delegation in Armenia with the first EUSR to the South Caucasus, 
Ambassador Talvite (International Crisis Group 2006, 21), in 2004, and another one by the 
EUSR Political Advisors, in June 2007, which Ambassador Semneby did not accompany.
65 
The EUSR met at the time with NKR representatives in Armenia, while his Political Advisors 
travelled to Stepanakert/ Khankendi and met both with the political leadership and civil 
society. Although there has been no continuation of these contacts with civil society and the 
visit of the EUSR has not taken place yet, it was an important step to balance the EU’s conflict 
resolution policies in the region, too centred on Georgia. 
 
There has been another project financed under the ENPI regional projects, run by two 
experts promoting meetings between representatives from the two countries and from NKR. 
The project run as a track-two diplomacy initiative with three stages: in the first stage, experts 
from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh and Turkey met, in four seminars, to discuss 
consequences of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict; in the second stage a bilateral meeting (the 
first in ten years) between officials from the Republic of Azerbaijan and of the NKR, followed 
by debriefings in Yerevan, Stepanakert/ Khankendi and Baku was envisioned. This initiative 
was closely monitored and sponsored by DG Relex and the EUSR for the South Caucasus, and 
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focused on CBMs, abstaining from discussing substantive matters under the OSCE Minsk 
Group. The third stage aimed at facilitating trilateral meetings between Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and NKR authorities, in Georgia, but major problems prevented the completion of the contract.  
 
In Armenia, the main obstacle to any visible impact of EU actions in the conflict is 
what many civil society actors call an “imitation of democracy”, making structural approaches 
highly ineffective.  On the other hand, under the ENPI, the EU has also been displaying a 
careful selection of projects and priorities, avoiding the financing of openly critic CSOs or 
those working on issues that are poorly perceived by the government. This has reduced the 
spectrum of CSOs to those “hunting” for funds, those CSOs closely linked to the government, 
and advocacy CSOs. One area where Armenian CSOs are hopeful of EU support is in cross-
border regional cooperation, border management and energy cooperation projects, which 
Armenia sees as confidence-building measures (much as the EU), but which Azerbaijan has 
refused to participate in. EU’s work with Azerbaijani CSOs in conflict resolution needs to 
become more visible, balancing its government-centred approach by supporting and improving 
CSOs capacity. This should include not only democracy and human rights CSOs, but also more 
political and activist ones (which the EU has refused to assist), since they are under great 
pressure, weakened by official policies and lack of funding.  
 
The EU should also make civil society an active stakeholder in setting the EU’s 
priorities for Azerbaijan, better framing financing to the situation on the ground and 
consequently empowering CSOs. The general impression is that over the last years, which 
roughly match the entrance of Azerbaijan to the Council of Europe and in the ENP initiative, 
conditions for civil society to develop and become a legitimate and empowered social agent 
have decreased. So we can say that although the EU has an indirect approach to conflict 
resolution, through a broad human rights approach, it is operating in fast deteriorating 
environment. Moreover, EU activities in Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus region lack an 
articulation towards the goal of peace. Among the Karabakhi CSOs EU engagement is mostly 
welcomed and expectations are high regarding the scope of activities where the EU could get 
involved (civil society development, mediation, training, financial assistance for democracy 
and human rights projects and assistance to the refugee community). There are, however, some 
reservations, also expressed by the NKR representative in Yerevan, regarding EU engagement 30 
 
in conflict resolution.
66 Considering the recognition of Kosovo by most EU member states, and 
EU engagement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Union is now perceived in Karabakh as 
applying double standards and thus it will be necessary to develop trust between people in 
Nagorno Karabakh and the EU before more high profile issues could be approached.
67 
 
The possibility of more EU engagement in conflict resolution, namely in changing the 
structural conditions around the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, has been facilitated by some level 
of depolitisation of the context, making the EU more suitable to promote a less geopolitical 
approach. Most interviewees consider that civil society can only be effective in conflict 
transformation if there are concrete steps towards a political agreement at the top level. In that 
sense the EU is well positioned to put pressure on the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan 
and to increase contacts between the two sides, developing eventually an international 
confidence-building programme, where trust can be restored and the international community 
can also improve its stance as security providers once a peace agreement is reached.   
 
5.  Explaining EU activities in the civil society domain 
The EU has focused on mid- and top-level CSOs, mainly aiming to develop 
interlocutors on the ground for its governance policies. In the framework of the ENP, the EU 
has attempted to raise the status of civil society as an agent in public life, mainly by promoting 
forms of dialogue between CSOs and government officials. The EU has supported feedback 
mechanisms for governmental policies to be analysed by civil society and seeks to make civil 
society an integral part of its monitoring mechanisms, particularly in the context of the EaP 
initiative. This would fit well into the Liberal Pace Paradigm hypothesis, proposed in the 
conceptual paper (Tocci 2008), since the EU has focused on reinforcing the linkages between 
government structures and mid-level CSOs with access to EU funds and with the dimension 
and skills to assess public policies and present them to the society at large as well as the 
international community. The EU has also financed workshops, debates and training, granting 
mid-level CSOs the opportunity to reach to the grassroots. The EU has also provided other 
donors with a commonly accepted framework (the ENP Action Plans) which serves as a 
reference point in their interaction with civil society and governments, reinforcing this liberal 
perspective.  
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Although this approach is favoured by the EU, there are several problems with its 
implementation. First, EU focus on developing civil society capacity has delivered only a 
hand-full of organisations with the capacity to manage Commission grants and develop long-
term projects, usually privileged by the EU. Both the EIDHR and the NSALA Programmes 
present shortcomings in terms of their reach to local CSOs, while the capacity of European 
Commission delegations on the ground to manage such programmes is still being fully 
developed. This leads to a concentration of resources and knowledge in few organisations that 
is prevents an equal development across civil society. Second, in Azerbaijan and Nagorno 
Karabakh, the EU is either a new comer or an absent player, limiting the scope of its impact 
both at the governmental and civil society level. As far as conflict resolution is concerned, the 
EU has been unable and unwilling to take a more pro-active stance and its engagement has 
been conditional on several factors, including the priority awarded to the Minsk Group 
mediation efforts, which are not questioned by any of the sides. The EU also prioritised 
Georgia in its conflict resolution and conflict transformation efforts in the South Caucasus, 
leaving civil society actors, which are dealing with the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, in a 
marginal position. By not instigating the development of conflict-related projects by civil 
society, the EU has helped to maintain the status quo around the NK conflict, privileging 
stability. The context has now changed drastically, providing the opportunity for EU 
engagement, namely with and through civil society.  
 
To a certain extent, then, EU engagement in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict fits the 
realist critique, which places state actors at the heart of conflict resolution. EU focus on the 
governmental level, first and foremost, has reinforced the government in Azerbaijan, 
legitimising it through engagement, while avoiding major contacts with CSOs engaged in 
denouncing and watch-dog activities. In Armenia, EU presence and co-operation with 
government has been perceived by civil society actors as a good way to put pressure on the 
government and has opened the political space for dialogue on conflict. Naturally this has been 
facilitated by Armenia’s position on the conflict and by some level of openness of the 
Armenian regime that is not visible in Azerbaijan. In Nagorno Karabakh the EUSR has led EU 
contacts and has dealt both with civil society and political representatives, though sporadically. 
We can therefore conclude that the EU does prioritise contacts with state actors and does 
recognise their importance in solving the conflict, although the official approach reserves an 
important role for civil society, which the lack of resources and the delicate political and social 
context of the region have prevented from fully developing. EU impact on civil society has 32 
 
mainly been built through the ENP, including through processes of accountability, increased 
support and opportunity to develop skills and ideas. So far this approach is missing a direct link 
to conflict resolution.  
 
There is also the potential for EU actions to develop into the framework envisioned by 
the leftist critique hypothesis. This perspective sees EU engagement as detrimental to conflict 
resolution by either leading to the mushrooming of more de-politicised technical CSOs or by 
over politicising and co-opting CSOs working around the conflict. As we have seen, as far as 
the EU has managed to have an impact on civil society in Armenia and Azerbaijan, it has 
privileged less political ones, particularly in Azerbaijan. In Nagorno Karabakh the EU has not 
deployed the means to have any visible result. The legitimacy of the mid and top-level CSOs 
with which the EU is working in the framework of the ENP has been maintained, as most of 
the CSOs in this study remain closely linked to their communities, despite the controversy of 
supporting contact across the frontline. EU support for civil society development through 
training, network development and governmental support, has maintained a good level of 
interconnectedness throughout the society, as envisioned by the Liberal paradigm hypothesis. 
However, the EU has to compete with other donors (including the Azerbaijani state and the 
Armenian Diaspora) for an impact on civil society and conflict resolution, since it remains a 
relatively complex and new donor in the region. Moreover, inside Nagorno Karabakh the EU is 
completely absent, and there is a long road ahead before it is regarded as a trust-worthy partner 




Abasov, A. and Khachatrian, H. (2006) Karabakh Conflict Variants of Settlement: concepts 
and reality. 3
rd edition. Baku/Yerevan: Areat, Noyan Tapan. 
Abbasov, S. (2009) “Azerbaijan: Karabakh IDPs Emerge to Promote Baku’s Peace Plan”, 
Eurasianet, 25 September, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav092509a.shtml  
[02.11.2009] 
Aliev, A. et al. (2006) Karabakh Conflict: To understand each other. Yerevan: Velas Print 
LLC. 
Alieva, L. (2006) “EU and the South Caucasus”, CAP Discussions Paper, Bertelsmann Group 
for Policy Research, December,  
http://www.cap.lmu.de/download/2006/2006_Alieva.pdf [02.11.2009].  
Alisayidov, E. (2008) “Co-Chair Vote against UN Resolution on Karabakh Conflict Imperils 
Negotiation Process”, CACI Analyst, 10(7), 2 April. 
Annual Action Programme for Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in Development 
(2008), ANNEX I. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/aap/2008/ec_aap-
2008_dci-nsa_en.pdf [02.11.2009] 
Avetisian, T. (2008) “New Armenian Group Demands Hard Line on Karabakh”, 
ArmeniaLiberty, 30 October. 
http://www.armenialiberty.org/content/article/1598077.html [02.11.2009] 
Baghdasarian, L. and Yunusov, A. (2005) ‘War, social change and ‘no war, no peace’ 
syndromes in Azerbaijan and Armenian societies’, in Laurence Broers (ed.) The limits 
of leadership: elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process, Accord, 
17, Conciliation Resources. 
Broers, L. (2006) ‘The resources for Peace: comparing the Karabakh, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia Peace processes’, Conciliation Resources. http://www.c-
r.org/resources/occasional-papers/resources-for-peace.php [02.11.2009] 
Council of the European Union (2006) Presidency Report to the European Council on EU 
activities in the framework of prevention, including implementation of the EU 
Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, 10158/06, Brussels, 13 June. 
Crisis Management Initiative (2007) Matching Words and Deeds: Enhancing Civil Society 
Contribution to Building Black Sea Regional Security, Conference Report, Bucharest, 
October. 34 
 
de Waal, T. (2003) Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, New 
York: New York University Press.  
de Waal, T. (2009) The Karabakh Trap: Dangers and dilemmas of the Nagorny Karabakh 
conflict, Conciliation Resources. http://www.c-r.org/our-
work/caucasus/documents/Karabakh_Trap_FINAL.pdf [02.11.2009] 
Derlugian, G. (2003) Bordieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus. A world-system biography. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
EPLO (2006) Five years after Göteborg: The EU and its conflict prevention potential, Conflict 
Prevention Partnership report, September. 
EU-Armenia ENP Action Plan (2006) 
EU-Armenia PCA (1999)  
EU-Azerbaijan ENP Action Plan (2006) 
EU-Azerbaijan PCA (1999) 
EuropeAid (2009) “Support to Civil Society and Human Rights: EC-funded projects in 
Azerbaijan”, January 
European Commission (2006) Non-paper expanding on the proposals contained in the 
communication to the European Parliament and the Council on “Strengthening the 
ENP” – Strengthening the civil society dimension of the ENP, COM(2006) 726 final, 
4 December. 
European Commission (2007) Communication from the Commission to the Council and to the 
European Parliament: Black Sea Synergy - a new regional cooperation initiative. 
COM(2007) 160 final, Brussels, 11 April. 
European Commission (2009) Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum Concept paper.  
European Council (2001) EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, adopted at 
the European Council in Göteborg, June. 
http://www.conflictprevention.net/library/documents/thematic_issues/eplo5yearafterw
eb.pdf [02.11.2009] 
European Economic and Social Committee (2009a) Opinion of the European Economic and 
Social Committee on Involvement of civil society in the Eastern Partnership. 
Rapporteur: Mr Voleš, REX/271, Civil society – Eastern Partnership, Brussels, 13 
May.  
European Economic and Social Committee (2009b) Opinion of the European Economic and 
Social Committee on Civil society involvement in implementing the ENP Action Plans 
in the countries of the Southern Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. 35 
 
Rapporteur: Andrzej Adamczyk, REX/241, ENP Action Plans in the countries of the 
Southern Caucasus Brussels, 14 May. 
Freizer, S. (2008) “Nagorno-Karabakh – A Frozen Conflict That Could Boil Over”, European 
Voice, 31 January. 
Gahramanova, A. (2006) Identity Conflicts and its implications for conflict management, 
UNISCI Discussion Papers, 11, May, 153-186. 
Gahramanova, A. (2007) Peace strategies in “frozen” ethno-territorial conflicts: integrating 
reconciliation into conflict management. The case of Nagorno Karabakh, 
Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, Working Paper, 103. 




Griporyan, M. and Rzayev, S. (2005) “Between Freedom and taboo media: coverage of the 
Karabakh conflict” in Laurence Broers (ed) The limits of leadership: elites and 
societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process, Accord, 17, Conciliation 
Resources. 
Guliyev, F. (2009) “Oil Wealth, Patrimonialism, and the Failure of Democracy in Azerbaijan” 
Caucasus Analytical Digest, 2, 2-5.  
Hasanov, A. and Ishkanian, A. (2005) “Bridging divides: civil society peacebuilding 
initiatives”, in Laurence Broers (ed) The limits of leadership: elites and societies in 
the Nagorny Karabakh peace process, Accord, 17, Conciliation Resources. 
Herrberg, A. et al. (2009) Engaging the EU in Mediation and Dialogue: Reflections and 
Recommendations, Synthesis report, Initiative for Peacebuilding, May.  
Human Rights Center of Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan National Committee of the International 
Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (2004) Status of Civil and Political Rights in 
Azerbaijan in 2004, December. 
International Crisis Croup (2005) Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace, Europe Report, 167, 
11 October. 
International Crisis Group (2006) Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Role, 
Europe Report, 173, 20 March. 
International Crisis Group (2007) Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War, Europe Report, 187, 14 
November. 36 
 
International Crisis Group (2009) Nagorno-Karabakh: Getting to a Breakthrough, Europe 
Briefing, 55, 7 October. 
Karpat, C. (2005) “‘Karabakh's Liberator’: Diplomacy Harms Azerbaijan, Helps Armenia”, 
Axis Information and Analysis, Turkish section, 21 October. 
http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=448 [02.11.2009]. 
Khachatrian, H. (2009) “Armenia and Azerbaijan: OSCE Wants Civil Society Groups to Help 
Karabakh Peace Process”, Eurasianet, 2 April. 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav040209af.shtml 
[02.11.2009]. 
Ljubljana Declaration – Development of civil dialogue and partnership relations between civil 
society, national governments and EU institutions, International Conference: Giving a 
stronger voice to civil society in the European neighbourhood, Brdo, Slovenia, 2 April 
2008. http://www.trialog.or.at/images/doku/ljubljana_declaration.pdf [02.11.2009] 
Lynch, D. (2004) Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States: Unsolved conflicts and de facto States. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
Milanova, N. (2008) “The Territory-Identity Nexus in the Conflict over Nagorno Karabakh: 
Implications for OSCE Peace Efforts” Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in 
Europe (2).  http://www.ecmi.de [02.11.2009] 
Mirimanova, N. (2009) Mediation and Dialogue: Official and Unofficial Strands, Initiative for 
Peacebuilding, January 
Özkan, B. (2008) “Who Gains from the ‘No War No Peace’ Situation? A Critical Analysis of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, Geopolitics (13), 572 - 599. 
Poghosyan, T. (2009) The Armenian ENP and Conflict Resolution in Nagorno Karabakh, 
ICHD/CMI, Yerevan, September.  
Popescu, N. (2007) Europe’s Unrecognised Neighbours: The EU in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. CEPS Working Document, 260, 15 March. 
Priego Moreno, A. (2005) The creation of the Azerbaijani identity and its influence on foreign 
policy. UNISCI Discussion Papers, May. 
Raik, K. (2006) Promoting Democracy through Civil Society: How to Step up the EU’s Policy 
towards the Eastern Neighbourhood, CEPS Working Document, 237, February. 
Sarkisyan, M. (2009) Karabakh 2014 Scenarios, Discussion Paper presented at the  
Conciliation Resources “Karabakh 2014” project meeting, London, 10 July. 
Stewart, E. (2008) “Capabilities and Coherence? The Evolution of EU Conflict Prevention”, 
European Foreign Affairs Review 13 (2), 229-54. 37 
 
Svensson, I. (2009) The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Lessons from the mediation efforts, 
Initiative for Peacebuilding, March. 
Tocci, N. (2008) The European Union, Civil Society and Conflict Transformation. 
MICROCON Policy Working Paper, 1, July. 
UNHCR (2006) “Country operations plan, overview, country: Armenia”, 
http://www.unhcr.org/home/PROTECTION/434138e32.pdf [02.11.2009]. 
United States Department of State (2009) 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 
2008 Human Rights Report: Azerbaijan, February 25.  
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119068.htm [02.11.2009]. 
USAID (2008) NGO sustainability index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, 11th 
Edition – June 2008. 
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2007/complete_do
cument.pdf [02.11.2009]. 
Veselý, B. (ed.) (2008) Contemporary History Textbooks in the South Caucasus, Pague: 
Association for International Affairs. 
Vorrath, J. et al, (2007) Linking Ethnic Conflict and Democratization: An Assessment of Four 
Troubled Regions. National Centre of Competence in Research, Challenges to 
Democracy in the 21st Century, Working Paper, 6, University of Zurich. 
http://www.nccrdemocracy.uzh.ch/nccr/publications/workingpaper [02.11.2009]. 
Weiss, A. and Nazarenko, A. (1997) Strategies and needs of NGOs dealing with ethno-political 
conflicts in the new eastern democracies, Berghof Occasional paper, 7, March. 
Yerevan and Baku Press Clubs (2004) The Karabakh conflict and prospects for settling it: 
Results of sociological research and media coverage. Yeni Nesil.  
 